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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently appears in U.S. media depicted as a 
rival of America’s hegemonic power because of the PRC’s rapid economic development.  
China’s large economic growth is often credited as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms.  In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping opened up China’s market to the foreign nations—
breaking away from traditional communist economy—an action which expanded China’s 
economic growth.  However, the welcomed economic growth and development brought 
unwelcomed environmental pollution and degradation.1  Environmental issues are becoming a 
problem that China can no longer regard as insignificant.  China must address pollution and 
degradation as environmental awareness continues to grow because of the increasing 
development of social unrest and health problems.  As environmentalism has become a more 
widespread phenomenon, the actions China takes on environmental policies have potential to 
influence its economy.  
While China had environmental laws in place, the laws had weak political teeth; 
however, China did not dismiss environmental concerns nor were they unaware of them.  
Contrary to popular belief, China has been well aware of environmental problems since the Qin 
Dynasty (which will be discussed further in Chapter 5).  Furthermore, the modern Chinese 
government was also aware of environmental degradation and pollution. Elizabeth Economy 
points out an early pollution incident that prompted environmental action. In the mid-1970s, Mao 
Zedong commenced the construction of two dams to mitigate flooding from the Huai River.  
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: the Environmental Challenge to China's Future, 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 3. 
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Unfortunately, the dams are a source of numerous pollutants that have affected the river.2  In 
response to the dying river, Chairman Mao created the Huai River Valley Bureau of Water 
Resource Protection and the Huai River Conservancy Commission on the Ministry of Water 
Resources.3 Although these offices were created to handle the pollution of the Huai River, they 
were not supplied funding or authority—a tradition often followed in China in terms of 
environmental protection.  Thus, without a viable solution, the deterioration of Huai River 
continues.   
Kenneth Lieberthal states, “The People’s Republic of China presents a paradox.”4  To 
elaborate, the Chinese government is well aware of the many environmental problems that occur 
throughout the nation; China has a notable environmental legal system, and an administration 
dedicated to environmental protection. China’s environmental legal system is the Environmental 
Protection Law (EPL) adopted in 1989.  Additionally, China’s State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) is responsible for drafting environmental laws, monitoring, enforcing, 
and assessing environmental impacts.5   Externally, the PRC’s environmental policy is ostensibly 
impressive; however, a closer examination provides a glimpse of a convoluted system, a need for 
incentives, and the need for a stronger enforcement capacity.   
The change in environmental bureaucracy in 2008 may be the necessary modification 
needed for more productive environmental management.  The shift indicates that the Chinese 
government understands the importance of environmental protection in the 21st century.  The 
transformation of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) signified a shift in balance of power from a solely pro-
                                                 
2 Elizabeth Economy, 2. 
3 Elizabeth Economy, 3.  
4 Kenneth Lieberthal, "China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental Policy 
Implementation," China Environment Series (1997), 1. 
5 Economy, 106.  
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development oriented nation to one that also has a federal government implementing 
environmental policy on the state level.  This thesis considers three possible explanations for the 
bureaucratic reform: 1) internal pressures, 2) bureaucratic politics, and 3) superficial change.  
The first explanation proposes that increased income, higher education, and a drive for economic 
success increased internal pressure that resulted in the creation of MEP.  The second source 
refers to China’s convoluted government system that surrounds environmental management (this 
is further discussed in Chapter 2), and reform would suggest that environmentalist were able to 
garner more political support.  However, the challenges in accurately decoding an off-the-record 
political victory make this explanation the least promising.  The third explanation implies that 
the reform is only a cosmetic change in response to both domestic and international 
environmental concerns.  In the last two years, data from China provides circumstantial evidence 
that indicates a legislative response to environmental concerns, but there is not enough evidence 
to argue the bureaucratic reform is only a cosmetic change. In 2009, China hosted “The China 
Energy and Environment Summit," and in 2010, China will be hosting the “Air and Waste 
Management Association International Specialty Conference,” “The 3rd World Environmental 
Conference,” and the “International Conference on Challenges in Environmental Science and 
Computer Engineering” (CESCE). These conferences place China in a vulnerable position by 
exposing environmental problems that China in the past would have covered up.  Additionally, 
conferences permit experts to debate in open forums, or free range discussions that are often 
unpredictable.  This suggests the seriousness of China’s bureaucratic reform, undermining the 
idea that change was only cosmetic, thus the thesis focuses on first explanation—internal 
pressures. 
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The promotion of environmental protection was not unexpected, and this thesis further 
delves into three contributing factors of the bureaucratic reform—increased social pressure, 
economic development and social advancements, and trends in financial investments.  
Furthermore, the paper will examine the temporal momentum of the environmental movement 
leading up to the creation of MEP.  
Chapter 2 addresses the historical development and implications of the new ministry.  
The historical development further indicates the Chinese government’s awareness of 
environmental degradation, and breaks down the practice the government uses in addressing its 
environmental problems.  Chinese environmental history facilitates an understanding of China’s 
slow environmentalist evolution.  Furthermore, China’s Five-Year Plan is a more modern 
indication of the creation of the MEP.  The history and Five-Year Plan provide a framework for 
the future implications of the new ministry.  
Chapter 3 will be dedicated to the rise in social pressure on environmental issues and its 
impact on environmental policy in urban areas.  This chapter focuses solely on urban area 
because social pressure is greatest in areas with high population density; therefore environmental 
policy has been most politically successful in China’s cities.  Social pressure on environmental 
issues has increased due to a higher levels of education and awareness in conjunction with higher 
rates of pollution. The illiteracy rates (proxy for the level of education in each province), 
institutional growth as a gauge for environmental awareness, and emission rates (normalized 
with the region’s GDP) all indicate a rise in social pressure.  In turn, the national government has 
responded to social pressure on environmental issues—whether the response is productive will 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Benjamin Van Rooij and Elizabeth Economy both have 
evidence to support the notion that social pressures from cities have resulted in governmental 
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action, and additional evidence is found in the environmental consciousness of the 2008 Olympic 
Games.  These actions all hint towards a need for a stronger environmental bureaucracy. 
Chapter 4 discusses another factor of the 2008 environmental bureaucracy reformation—
economic development.  The economic development in China has been rapid, with the economic 
growth rate exceeding that of most countries.6  This economic development has changed the 
dynamics of the PRC and increased the total pollution treatment investment.  Nationally, the 
development has lead to an expansion of the middle class, which in turn has changed the 
demands of the people.  This chapter provides evidences of the growth in the middle class by 
analyzing the purchasing power of the middle class and the decline of poverty levels.  As the 
focus of the new middle class is less oriented on subsistence, they begin to desire better living 
conditions.  Large factors in living conditions are clean air and clean water.  This chapter 
suggests that the middle class environmental demands have increased through the analysis of the 
Wuhan case study and environmentally caused health problems.  At the local level, the economic 
growth has placed expectations on the local officials to maintain their area’s economic 
development.  In conjunction with the convoluted bureaucratic system, the local conditions have 
resulted in unbreakable socio-economic ties, between officials and industries and between 
industries and employees, and corruption that determines the freedom to sanction and report 
environmental violations.   
Chapter 5 investigates financial investment—overall, state, and foreign investments—as 
the final factor in the creation of the MEP.  The nation’s investments aimed at environmental 
technology, remediation, and research are expected to increase; however, due to limited data the 
study uses total investment in the treatment of industrial pollution as a proxy.  Based on the total 
pollution treatment investment, it is hypothesized that these demands will result in an increase in 
                                                 
6 Paul Harris, Green or Brown? Environmental Attitudes and Governance in Greater China, 152. 
Dang- 7 
 
the overall state environmental budget and overall foreign investment on pollution treatment.  
The data used to support the hypotheses was collected from the SEPA’s Environmental Statistics 
Report.  The data did not support the two hypotheses.  However, the data did suggest an increase 
in self-fundraising. In conclusion, further research in the composition of self-fundraising and 
additional data with overall environmental investment would provide a more accurate assessment 
of environmental funding.     
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Chapter 2: The Transformation 
 
 
 The promotion of environmental management to the ministerial level was not an 
unexpected transition, but rather a long and slow one.   The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
monitored environmental developments since 1972 but it was not until the combination of local 
pressure, international attention, and extreme degradation of the environment that the national 
government shifted the balance of power.  China has acknowledged environmental issues as far 
back as the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.).  National officials have the ability to see the entire 
scope of environmental degradation in China that is not visible to local citizens.  Many Chinese 
do not realize environmental problems exist unless they are adversely affected.  Moreover, those 
affected do not realize the extent of environmental problems, and that human activities are the 
source of pollution.  Originally, the problem was insignificant, but unsustainable production in 
China caused a need for more immediate environmental pollution control.  The shift in the 
central government’s stance on environmental policy has been a slow process, evident in the 
changes in the Five Year Plan and adoption of environmental policy.  The culmination of the 
SEPA becoming MEP signifies a change in future environmental management for the developing 
nation. 
The shift to MEP indicates environmental protection rising on the political agenda, but 
not a lowering of economic development standards.  The continuum of Chinese history shows 
the country’s environmental policy development; however, no matter the level of environmental 
awareness, economic development was going to take priority.  Furthermore, the Five-Year Plan 
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suggests gradual growth in environmental policy leading up to the implementation of MEP.  
Additionally, this chapter considers the implications of the new ministry.    
History of Chinese Environmental Protection 
   Environmental protection has been slowly growing in China but to comprehend the 
evolution, the beginning of China’s environmental protection must be established. Historically, 
environmental legal regulations trace back to the four Chinese dynasties: Qin Dynasty (221-206 
B.C.), Tang Dynasty (618-907), Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) that all 
promoted the practice of sustainability forestry and resource extraction.7  Although the practice 
started as a recommendation, it indicates the importance of environmental protection.  However, 
the importance of practiced sustainable philosophy was dismissed during Mao Zedong’s regime.  
The philosophy was replaced with Mao’s metaphor “the war against nature.”  Mao demanded 
that the people conquer nature, destroying any sustainable practices that had been practiced.8  It 
was not until the post-Mao era that environmental issues could be addressed, and only recently 
that China took a more proactive stance on environmental issues and policies.9   
In the past, the central government has not placed environmental protection as a national 
priority.  This is evident in the “Environmental Protection Law” (EPL), which is the nation’s 
framework for environmental lawmaking and China’s comprehensive environmental law.  The 
EPL’s construction traces back to the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Premier Zhou Enlai attended 
                                                 
7 Song Ying, "The Chinese Environmental Lawmaking Framework," Chinese Journal of 
International Law 1.1 (Jan. 2002): 226 
8 Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 4. 
9 Ross Lester and Mitchell Silk, “Post-Mao China and Environmental Protection: The Effects of 
Legal and Politico-Economic Reform” (Pacific Basin Law Journal 66, 1985) 66. 
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the conference, which became the turning point for Chinese environmental policy.  The 
conference caused Premier Zhou Enlai great concern and he reacted by placing environmental 
protection on the government’s agenda.10  A year after the conference, a provisional draft was 
published called the “Rules on the Protection and Improvement of the Environment.” These rules 
have since served as the outline for environmental lawmaking in China.11  In 1979, the 
“Environmental Protection Law” was in its provisional state, and it was not until 1989 that the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress formally adopted the “Environmental 
Protection Law.”  It then took eleven years for the government to announce that environmental 
protection would become state policy, and promulgate the Marine Environmental Protection 
Law.12   Seemingly large, the shift to Marine Environmental Protection Law was in fact trivial 
because of the weak enforcement.  Tun-jen Cheng found further evidence of an ineffective law in 
Article 26 of the EPL, as Article 26 requires environmental facilities’ construction to be 
simultaneous with the construction and of power plants and any changes or construction of 
power plants must be approved by the SEPA.13  However, this law is simply lip service as it is 
poorly enforced.  Blatant disregard for this law is evident in Inner Mongolia’s behavior as 
discovered by the national government in 2005.  An accident in the construction of an 
unauthorized power plant claimed six lives and national attention.  During investigation, the 
central government discovered ten more power plants not approved by the SEPA.  Tun-jen 
Cheng credited this behavior to Inner Mongolia’s developing the economy, as it had the highest 
GDP growth rate for 2002-2006 and the ability to undermine Article 26.14   
                                                 
10 Ying, 227. 
11 Ying, 227. 
12 Ying, 227. 
13 Tun-jen Cheng, 121. 
14 Tun-jen Cheng, 139. 
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The diction of the EPL expresses China’s desire for economic success.  The political 
framework promotes an incentive system that “spark[s] the genuine enthusiasm of territorial 
leaders at all levels … to succeed in their quest to jump start the Chinese economy.”15  Due to the 
convoluted path of communication, an order issued from the central government could result 
with great error.  Therefore, the solution (not codified) is that each level of government provides 
the level below it leniency in order to promote economic growth and stability.  Furthermore, 
rapid economic success is rewarded with promotions and other benefits.16  In the advancement of 
environmental protection, China’s economic prerogative still permeates throughout the EPL 
resulting in environmental policies that “are too complex, long term, and deeply enmeshed in 
competing economic interest to be effective.”17  In the EPL, chapter 1 General Provisions, 
Article 4 states, “The plans for environmental protection formulated by the state must be 
incorporated into the national economic and social development plans; the state shall adopt 
economic and technological policies and measures favorable for environmental protection so as 
to coordinate the work of environmental protection with economic construction and social 
development.”  China’s initial solution to addressing environmental problems was the creation of 
the EPL.  Unfortunately, its creation did not address every component to a complete 
environmental management system, especially in terms of enforcement.  Although the issue of 
enforcement was addressed, the EPL did not place any form of policing in the policy.  
The framework of the “Environmental Protection Law” is well written and organized.  
The layout consists of six chapters; General Provisions, Supervision and Management of the 
Environment, Protection and Improvement of the Environment, Prevention and Control of 
                                                 
15 Lieberthal, 4. 
16 Lieberthal, 5. 
17 Lieberthal, 6. 
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Environment Pollution and Other Public Hazard, Legal Liability, and Supplementary Provisions.  
Each chapter is thorough in its explanations and expectations.  Combined, the chapters cover the 
needed stages of legal environmental protection.  However, the composition is particularly vague 
concerning administrative responsibilities.  For example, in EPL Chapter II Supervision and 
Management of the Environment, Article 10 states, “The competent department of 
environmental protection administration under the State Council shall, in accordance with the 
national standards for environment quality and the country’s economic and technological 
conditions, establish the national standards for the discharge of pollutants…”  This Article 
suggests the manipulation of international environmental law forced to satisfy the Chinese 
government.  Titles were unavailable and inappropriate during the composition of the law; 
therefore, the language of the article sought to compensate for the lack of environmental 
establishments in China at the time.  This law was adopted in 1989, and since the “competent 
department” has transitioned four times, from the Leading Group for the ministry to National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in 
1998 to the current Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China in 
2008, proving the vague language suitable for the nation.  China’s environmental legal sector is 
still developing, as indicated in the recent changes of environmental government roles, 
responsibility, and setup.  The “competent department of environmental protection 
administration under the State Council” is wordy and provides too much room for interpretation.  
The lack of an aggressive environmental policy creates challenges for enforcement of 
environmental policy.  Thus, the most recent transition (to MEP) should result in environmental 
policy with a more definitive language in the near future.    
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The underlying problem in the application of the environmental protection policy in 
China is the convoluted distribution of authority.  The rest of Article 10 says,  
“The people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly 
under the Central Government may establish their local standards for the discharge of 
pollutants for items not specified in the national standards; with regard to items already 
specified in the national standards, they may set local standards which are more stringent 
than the national standards and report the same to the competent department of 
environmental protection administration under the State Council for the record.  Units 
that discharge pollutants in areas where the local standards for the discharge of pollutants 
have been established shall observe such local standards.”  
The law provides local government the ability to set its own standards with the expectations of 
the standards being higher if able to meet higher standards.  This allows the central government 
to set a more moderate standard without being criticized for lack of action because the central 
government can claim that provinces have higher standards and the moderate standard is set to 
protect provinces that are not as well off.   In reality, this ability to manipulate the law increases 
a provinces chance in meeting standards.  Thus, what occurs is a high number of provinces 
obeying the law, but a lack of strong, long-term environmental policies.  Elizabeth Economy also 
discussed how ineffective policy implementation on the ground level was due to economic 
oriented behavior and disincentives for local government officials and businesses.  It was not 
until 2000, that environmental protection was given true national priority in the release of the 
tenth Five-Year Plan, placing environmental performance parallel with industrial productivity.   
The Chinese Government and Guangxi 
 
China’s multilayered authoritative structure imposes power execution by rank; however, 
over time, communication through informal networking is often more effective.  The Chinese 
refer to informal networking as guanxi, translated as “connections” or “relations.”  Guanxi is 
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applied to the Chinese political and social scene, and is established by family connections or 
having attended schools with the right people.  These connections often trump hard work and 
initiative because they are the most powerful path in China and are culturally acceptable.  
Furthermore, connections are viewed as an honorable way to assist a member of one’s network 
to achieve important goals.18  Thus, it is not surprising that guanxi is reportedly found to be 
applied and accepted in the Chinese government.  Guanxi can override laws19 and create an 
environment of lack of accountability in the relationship between government and society.  
In order to comprehend guanxi’s application and acceptance, an understanding of the 
Chinese government is needed. Chinese authority is disseminated from the central government, 
which is responsible for the entire country.  The remainder of the distribution goes to the thirty-
one provinces, six hundred cities, two thousand counties, one hundred thousand townships, and 
close to one million villages.20 In Kenneth Lieberthal’s work, China’s Governing System and its 
Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation, he refers to this as the vertical line of authority.  
Each of these territorial levels contains numerous bureaucratic ranks, which ostensibly facilitate 
the vertical line of authority and communication.  That said, although an office may in fact be in 
a higher territorial level, it may share the same bureaucratic rank with an office in a lower 
territorial level.  The lines of communication and authority become complicated with the 
bureaucratic ranks in territorial levels—the horizontal line of authority—conflicting with the 
vertical authority, especially during the execution of policy.21  The extensive line of 
communication used to issue an order is the same line of communication a lower ranking official 
must take to pass required information or data.  Thus, the application of guanxi in the Chinese 
                                                 
18 Mary Wang, Turning Bricks into Jade: Critical Incidents for Mutual Understanding Among 
Chinese and Americans (Boston: Intercultural, 2000), 34.  
19 Wang, 34.  
20 Lieberthal, 3. 
21 Lieberthal.  
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governing system is used to ease the process of communication.  However, the application of 
guanxi benefits officials that have a more extensive network.  The line of communication 
coupled with the government’s preeminent bureaucracy, which has broad jurisdiction and duty 
for economic development, left the SEPA with very little power. 22 
Five-Year Plan 
The Five-Year Plan was adopted in 1953 as Mao Zedong tried to boost China’s industry.  
The Five-Year Plan originated from Stalin’s Five-Year Plan that was allegedly very successful 
and attempted to reform steel, coal, and iron production.23  China’s Five-Year Plan was a series 
of initiatives oriented around economic development, set by leaders in the Chinese Communist 
Party during plenary sessions of the Central Committee and national congress.  There have been 
eleven Five-Year Plans since 1953, and the first Five-Year Plan including environmental 
protection is the sixth report released in 1981.  The sixth report promoted sustainable economic 
growth in China and the tenth objective listed in the report aims “to strengthen environmental 
protection efforts.”  However, it was not until the tenth Five-Year Plan that environmental 
protection was explicitly given political priority.  The tenth report specifically mentions, “[the 
goal] to increase forest coverage to 18.2 percent, and urban green rate to 35 percent.  The total 
amount of major urban and rural pollutants discharged will be reduced by 10 percent as 
compared with 2000, and more measures would be taken to protect and save natural resources.”  
The tenth report gave more clear specification of national environmental goals and placed 
environmental protection on an equal level with economic success.  The explicit mentioning of 
environmental protection in the Five-Year Plan was a large environmental advancement in China 
                                                 
22 Tun-jen Cheng, 122. 
23 Stalin and Mao: Marxism Two Ways. Rep. Professor Perritt. 
<http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/white-final-Seminar%20Paper.pdf>. 
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and proponent to the MEP.  Economic success has always been China’s top priority because it is 
a measure of national success and pride and allows the nation to be a world power.  As 
aforementioned, the language of the EPL clearly places economic success at the forefront.  The 
following report, the eleventh Five-Year Plan, and most current report proposes to reduce total 
emissions by 15 percent and bring China's energy efficiency up by 30 percent.  The Five-Year 
Plan report provided evidence that the government has started to prioritize environmental 
protection.  The central government creates and gives these reports to the local officials to 
delegate research and enforce laws.  As mentioned in chapter 3, the Chinese governing system is 
a multilayered authoritative structure that often communicates through guanxi; thus, top-down 
delegation is most powerful and effective in regards to environmental policy.   Although 
environmental protection has now been codified, evidence, the actual implementation is 
questionable.   
SEPA TO MEP 
In 1998, the NEPA was upgraded to a ministerial-level agency, known as the State 
Environmental Protection Agency; however, the SEPA lacked ministerial status.  In March of 
2008, the Agency was established as its own ministry, the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
of the People’s Republic of China (MEP).  Understanding China’s political system helps 
understand the importance in this transition.  China is a multilayered state; although many states 
have adopted this political framework, China’s system encompasses a convoluted distribution of 
power.  Chinese main authority is disseminated from the central government, currently located in 
Beijing, which is responsible for all provinces including Special Economic Zones (SEZ).   The 
SEPA would receive the Five Year Plan reports including Environmental Protection standards 
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that set goals for local governments; however, SEPA had no means of enforcing the policy.  
SEPA was an agency outside of the line of authority, and often faced problems of insufficient 
funding and authority.  Thus, the SEPA was unable to enforce or hold local officials accountable 
for environmental regulations.  Each province was responsible for organizing environmental 
control, research, and monitoring. The lack of authority meant that local officials placed 
environmental responsibilities on the backburner because the more pressing concern was 
regional economic success.  The importance of economic development is held to the highest 
regard in China, as discussed in the paper.  Thus, it is not surprising to find additional 
impediments.  The rewards of promotions and job security are available to local officials when 
the areas they govern achieve regional economic success.  Encouragement in the form of 
monetary awards was not available for success in environmental protection.  The largest driving 
forces for environmental protection in a region were avid leaders in environmental protection. 
The transition to Ministry of Environmental Protection allocated environmental protection the 
necessary power to ensure the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection.   
Establishment of MEP reflects the new mentality of the Chinese government, and promoted the 
environmental protection priority of the Chinese government.   The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection mandates that environmental officials should increase the number of officials and 
funding, and promotes environmental officials to a rank higher than provincial officials, which is 
important in enforcing policies.   The MEP may be the enforcement and incentive system for 
environmental protection to implement environmental policies.24    
                                                 
24 Economy stated in The River Runs Black, “The need for a strong enforcement capacity as well 
as an incentive system for environmental protection remains a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of many new market-based environmental policies…”, before the 
implementation of MEP (P. 218).  Therefore, due to the short duration of MEP’s role there is no 
accurate assessment on whether MEP addresses Economy’s argument.  
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Chapter 3: Social Pressures 
 
 
Superficially, the State of Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) changed to the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008.  However, on the domestic front there 
were numerous sources of pressure on the national government to place environmental protection 
higher on the political agenda.  One such demand was from the local population.  A high 
population concentration in close proximity to industries creates a community that is more likely 
to be affected by pollution, thus more likely to try to address pollution problems.  Pollution 
increase is a result of industrial growth, and industrial growth is most prominent in urban areas.  
This chapter uses population density as a proxy for social pressure, as heavily populated areas 
affected by pollution are more inclined to complain, whereas sparsely populated areas are less 
likely to consider pollution a cause for concern.  
 This chapter advocates that social pressure on environmental issues in urban settings has 
increased resulting in a response from the government.  An increase in social pressure in urban 
areas is due to increased efforts in education.  Education in urban areas is higher because 
residents are less likely to need additional income from children.  Since it would be difficult to 
directly measure education, this paper uses illiteracy rates as a proxy.  Literacy is the most 
efficient method to spread environmental understanding and support, and encompasses the total 
population.  Another indication of the rise in social pressure is in the presence of environmental 
organizations and awareness.  Therefore, evidence of lower illiteracy rates in urban areas, an 
increased focus on education, and an increase in environmental organization and awareness in 
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urban areas will further indicate a rise in social pressure on environmental issues.  As a result of 
the rise in social pressure, high density areas have pressured the government for change, and in 
some situations, the government has given in to this pressure.  These culminating pressures are a 
factor in the eventual transition from the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
to Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).  
Education and Awareness 
The governments in these areas are more receptive to the local demand for a better-
quality environment.   In his paper Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the 
Enforcement of China’s Industrial Pollution Law, Benjamin Van Rooij finds a tendency for 
urban centers, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing,25 to be the more active 
enforcers and more stringent in terms of fines in regards to environmental protection.  He also 
states, “Urban centers thus seem to be more active and coercive when compared to normal 
provinces with large rural areas,” and thus notes that these “centers” have higher numbers of 
reported sanctions and are more severe in terms of fines.  This is a result of higher environmental 
awareness in urban areas.   
Environmental awareness is a result of the dense population’s proximity to environmental 
pollution, the high level of education, and more environmental knowledge that results from the 
environmental institutions and education system resources available to local citizens. Urban 
centers have the financial and academic resources to promote education which advocates 
environmental awareness and prevention.  Awareness of environmental pollution in urban 
centers explains the response to large numbers of complaints and sanctions.  As China continues 
                                                 
25 These four centers are categorized as provincial level municipalities are not the same as 
provinces; however, they are four large municipalities, densely populate, that enjoy provincial-
level administrative privileges. (Luo, 9).   
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to develop, the national environmental policy implemented at the state level will flourish in 
urban areas due to this higher level of environmental conscientiousness.   
Nationally, there has been an increased focus on education.  In 2001, the central and local 
governments increased the educational budget to 463.7 billion Yuan, a 20.49 percent raise from 
2000.26   There has also been an annual increase in the educational budgets since 1995 when the 
State Education Commission and Ministry of Finance implemented a project that is now the 
Education Law.27  The distributions of educational funds are not equal; the annual budget holds 
the central government responsible for allocating funds to higher-education institutions and local 
governments responsible for funding local (often primary) schools.  Local governments are 
expected to raise their own educational funds, but this is not often a top priority.  This method of 
distribution of educational funds widens the economic and educational gap between urban and 
rural areas, as higher-education institutions are most often located in urban areas, and can in the 
future further exaggerate an environmental governance gap between provinces.  This problem 
should be addressed with caution by the new environmental bureaucracy.  
Evidence of this educational gap can be found in urban areas having lower illiteracy rates 
and more universities and colleges than in rural areas.  An additional factor to the divide between 
urban and rural areas is the average higher monthly income of urban workers compared to that of 
rural workers.  This higher monthly income signifies a local economy in which more people 
benefit.  The economic background in a developing nation often determines a child’s opportunity 
for education.  Families in rural areas with poor economic backgrounds receive little government 
assistance and as a result, children are often forced to withdraw from school at an early age so 
                                                 
26 Jing Luo, Chen Aimin, and Song Shunfeng, China Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the 
People's Republic. Vol. I. (Westport: Greenwood, 2005) 142.  
27 Jing Luo, 145.  
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that they can work to supplement family income. 28  These children are most likely to remain 
illiterate, which harms their chances of higher income and education.  Thus they are less likely to 
be aware of environmental issues.  Figure 2.1 compares the province’s percentage of urban 
population with illiteracy rates.29  The average of the illiteracy number assignment is 2.367 (the 
recorded national illiteracy average is 16.4%; however, for consistency, the average of the 
converted data will be used), which is marked by the horizontal red line.  The provinces with 
illiteracy levels below the average have urban areas with an urban population of at least 40 
percent with three exceptions—Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Inner Mongolia.30  This indicates that 
urban areas are composed of a high level education population.  The lower illiteracy rates result 
from families keeping children in school.  Not only are urban parents keeping their children in 
primary school, but they are also preparing their children for a rigorous education by making 
them competitive candidates for highly ranked universities by sending their children to nursery 
school at the age of one and kindergarten between the ages of three to six.31  Low illiteracy rates 
increases the number of matriculated citizens. 
 
                                                 
28 Zhao Yaohui, "Labor Migration and Earnings Differences: The Case of Rural China," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 47.4 (July 1999) 
<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/452431>. 
29 The percentage of urban population proportional to the rest of the population in 1995 was 
categorized by a number ranging from 0 to 5 (0 indicates no data, 1corresponds to over 80%, 2 
corresponds to 60-80%, 3corresponds to 40-60%, 4 corresponds to 20-40%, and 5 corresponds to  
below 20%).  The percentage of illiteracy included people over 15 year-olds who were illiterate 
or semi-illiterate.  Illiteracy percentage was also assigned a number from 0-5 (0 indicates no 
data, 1corresponds to 7-11.9%, 2 corresponds to 12-15.9%, 3 corresponds 16-19.9%, 4corresponds 
to 20-25.9%, and 5 corresponds to 26% and above). 
30 Further data concludes that Zhejiang, Inner Mongolia, and Jiangsu are in ranked extremely 
high In terms of economic performance (reference Table X.X); however, does not gain ground in 
filling seats of the National People’s Congress.  
31 Jing Luo, 146.  
Dang- 22 
 
 
 
Urban parents establish an educational career path that sets up their children for academic 
success.  The market reforms from the 1980s are impacting education so that “private schools 
and colleges are growing rapidly in affluent areas.”  Rural areas do not classify as affluent as a 
result of documentation of worse health service, safe water, and sanitation than urban areas.  
Thus, it is fair to assess that urban areas are the affluent areas with growing numbers of private 
schools and colleges.  This expansion allows environmental awareness and understanding to 
advance to a scholarly level.  The educational facilities allow students to expand their knowledge 
Figure 3.1: China’s Provincial Illiterate and Urban 
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on environmental science and learn of environmental experiences abroad.  This education 
cultivates a rich atmosphere for the creation and expansion of environmental organizations.   
Environmental grassroots organizations have a tendency to congregate in urban areas due 
to the large urban work force available for environmental institutions with the necessary 
academic background.  Environmental organizations further promote and educate the local 
community on environmental sustainability.  Educational institutions increase the likelihood of 
environmental organizations to establish due to the high level of education and desire to act on 
problems, which further supports education and its connection to environmental awareness.  For 
example, the Center of Environmental Sciences (CES) was established at Peking University in 
1982.  The National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and Peking University 
supervised the Center’s activities so information is also passed on to the central government.  
CES strives to organize and coordinate environmental education, scientific research, and social 
services.32  The data on the environmental institutions is limited, thus rather than being able to 
show a growth in number of environmental institutions the data can support the number of 
environmental institutions as substantial.  In 2000, China was reported to have 2,133 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) compared to the United State’s 6,134 
NGOs.33  As expected China has fewer environmental organizations than America.  When 
compared to other large and developing countries (such as Brazil with 3,068 and India with 
3,005 NGOs), China is average.34   This is still significant due to China’s exclusive government 
and economic priority.  
                                                 
32 "Center of Environmental Sciences (CES), Peking University," (Asian Journal of Environmental 
Management 4.2, 1996), 141-42.  
33 “Environmental Governance and Institutions,” EarthTrends,  (World Resources Institute, 2007) 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/country_profiles/index.php?theme=10. 
34 “Environmental Governance and Institutions,” EarthTrends, (World Resources Institute, 2007) 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/country_profiles/index.php?theme=10. 
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High-density population encourages the creation of environmental institutions by 
increasing the rate at which knowledge and awareness of issues can spread.  In Tangshan city, 
700 residents blockaded the local tire-recycling plant after local officials refused to take action 
on the plant’s pollution (this chapter will be further expand on this incident).35  Pollution in 
densely populated areas will impact more people, thus the probability of people demanding or 
seeking a solution increase.  Increased knowledge of an issue leads to local awareness, which 
grows to command the attention of the local and eventually the national government.  The 
proximity to pollution, higher education levels, and environmental organizations increase 
environmental awareness, and this results in an environmentally proactive population. 
Urban Actions  
 As awareness and education continued to expand, the national government was forced  by 
social pressure to reprioritize environmental protection, apparent in the transition from SEPA to 
MEP.  The prioritization included environmental issues in urban areas such as air pollution and 
wastewater treatment.  Air pollution is a prominent problem in China’s urban areas due to the 
burning of fossil fuel in cars and industries.  Water pollution is nearly as problematic.36  Water 
pollution is a more egregious in areas rich in natural resources like coal.  Further, the presence of 
power plants in cities as a source of energy to the area also contributes to water pollution.  The 
Beijing case study and Van Rooij’s research defends social pressure on the local level as an 
effective method in political pursuits.   
Before delving into the evidence, a discussion of the relationship between urbanization 
and pollution is necessary to provide background to urban actions.  Urbanization causes 
environmental degradation because of industrial development. The increased industrial activity 
                                                 
35 Economy, 85. 
36 China: Air, Land, and Water: Environmental Priorities for a New Millennium (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 2001), 6.  
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then brings in substantial profits, which attract further industrial development.  This cycle is a 
positive feedback cycle.37  Urbanization began in the 1990s in medium-sized and smaller cities 
that were ill prepared for rapid growth, which further exacerbated the environmental degradation.  
Urbanization does not immediately result in cities; rather urbanization creates “administrative 
towns.”38  These “towns” expanded in number from about 10,000 in 1991 to over 17,000 in 
1999.39   This is problematic because these towns, which are less developed because of 
weakened infrastructure and financial instability, also cope with the same environmental issues 
as the larger cities.  Prophylactically, the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) 
hopes to maintain urbanization growth rates at .5-1.0 percent per annum during the tenth Five-
Year Plan period (refer to Chapter 2) to dampen urbanization’s pollution feedback cycle.40  
Do urban areas have more sanctions and fines because of more pollution rather than an 
increase in environmental consciousness?  Van Rooij assessed the number of complaints in each 
regions and found that, “complaints do indeed correlate significantly to the number of sanctions 
(Pearson correlation 0.316, Sig. 0.017) and the average fine per case (Pearson correlation 0.305, 
Sig 0.012).”  In other words, the number of complaints, in this case environmental awareness, 
does impact the number of sanctions, and is statistically significant enough to throw out the null 
hypothesis.   Furthermore, Van Rooij asserts, “Community complaints help EPBs 
[Environmental Protection Bureaus] pressed for resources inside the bureaucracy…for example, 
the Guangzhou EPB was able to act on increasing popular complaints against vehicular pollution 
                                                 
37 A positive feedback cycle enhances or amplifies changes, and moves a system from 
equilibrium to a more unstable state.  
38 An administrative town is the title for highly populated area that is below cities.  
39 China: Air, Land, and Water, 5. 
40 China: Air, Land, and Water, 5. 
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to convince the municipal government to adopt a total ban on nonleaded petrol,”41  which 
demonstrates that the government listens and manages the complaints.   Additionally, Tun-jen 
Cheng elaborates on the power of complaints, and their ability to enhance environmental 
administration’s power.42  These complaints combined with hard evidence of environmental 
damages enabled the administration to seek a proactive solution.43  Additionally, according to a 
study conducted by Jun Jing, an anthropologist, urban residents may be more disposed than rural 
residents to participate in protests over environmental issues.44  Jing’s study further supports 
urban social power to address environmental pollution.  In conclusion, the correlation between 
the number of sanctions and complaints, coupled with the results that such complaints evoked 
from the government, demonstrates the success of social pressures in environmental 
enforcement.   
A relatively recent example of urban actions occurred in preparation for the 2008 
Olympic Games.  Beijing started the “Clear Skies Initiative” to remove smog from the city.  The 
plan included new subway lines, a car ban, and cutting emissions of chemical plants and power 
stations by 30 percent.45  Although China adopted these initiatives to host the Beijing Summer 
Olympic Games, an international venue, the international pressure increased the domestic 
environmental consciousness and in turn the domestic pressure prompted some of the initiatives 
to continue after the Games.  The subway lines are still in use and due to the further expansion of 
                                                 
41 Benjamin Van Rooij, and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, "Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation 
in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law," (Law & Policy 32.1, 2010), 23. 
42 Tun-Jen Cheng, and Chung-min Tsai, "Powering Rent Seeking in the Electricity Industry" (New 
York: 2009), 121. 
43 Although solutions are sought, the Chinese environmental protection system does not have a 
strong enforcement capacity.  Therefore, the likelihood of solutions sought had no actually 
implication.  Hopefully, the transition to MEP will change this routine.  
44 Economy, 88. 
45 Beijing to Clear City's Air by Banning Cars, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25758302/(July 
2008). 
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routes and destinations; they are decreasing the need for cars.  The car ban originally restricted 
cars to driving on alternate days based on whether the end number of license plates was even or 
odd.  In addition to silver iodide rockets, which will be further discussed later in this chapter, the 
residents of Beijing experienced a less polluted and congested city.  The continuance of the ban 
now reportedly prohibits cars from driving once a week—the day dependent on the license 
plate.46  The remaining limitations implemented in the ban resulted from locals’ complaints 
about the exorbitant traffic and air pollution that returned to Beijing after the Olympic Games.  
Social pressures in this case helped to retain the law although it inconvenienced car owners.  Air 
in Beijing prior to 2008 was of very poor quality; however, the Olympic Games brought global 
attention that increased Beijing residents’ awareness of the health hazards of air pollution and 
increased pressure on the government to fix the problem.  
Urban environmental problems tend to be addressed retrospectively and only when they 
become serious.47  While the most desirable outcome does not always result, the sense of 
urgency by citizenry and government to assess and correct a problem is a contributing factor to 
future progress.   However, in order to improve the quality of the urban environment, 
“environmental agencies need to increase their participation in the urban planning process and 
increase the emphasis on minimization and avoidance.”48  The implementation of the MEP 
should change the relationship between social pressure and environmental pollution.  The federal 
government’s implementation of environmental policy at the state level should result in a 
decrease in emissions respective to its economic growth and thus a decrease in complaints from 
heavily populated areas.   
                                                 
46 Car Ban to Continue in Beijing, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-
03/15/content_19610542.htm (March 2010). 
47 China: Air, Land, and Water, 6. 
48 China: Air, Land, and Water, 8.  
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Government’s Response 
The government’s response to demands for environmental management comes in two 
forms—the local government and central government.  The local government’s response differs 
from the central government’s response because the local government is closer to the social 
pressures than the central state.  Therefore, people would expect the local government to respond 
more immediately, whereas, the national government can claim that they were unaware of the 
problem (refer to Chapter 2).  However, the national government is more willing to implement 
national laws.  Both governments hesitate on environmental policies and enforcement because 
economic prosperity is a top priority.   
As previously stated, environmental education and awareness has increased on a local 
and national basis.  Within the time frame of available data ranges from 1997 to 2005 awareness 
has increased.  However, there is evidence that local level government handled environmental 
problems and the national government did not actively enforce environmental policy.  
Considering the level of awareness is keener in areas with higher population density compared to 
areas with lower population density, local governments in urban areas will feel more pressure to 
decrease emission rates while maintaining economic growth.  This paper looks at three specific 
emission rates: waste water49, waste gas50, and industrial dust51 emissions.  This research focuses 
on water and air because both are vectors to industrial pollution and changes almost immediately 
                                                 
49 Waste water as defined by the MEP refers to volume of waste water discharged by industry 
enterprises through all their outlets—from production process, directly cooled water, 
groundwater from mining wells, and sewage from households mixed with water discharged by 
industry. 
50 The MEP defines waste gas emission as industrial waste gas discharge into the atmosphere 
containing pollutants generated from burning fuel and in production of enterprises. 
51 Industrial dust emission defined by MEP is the volume of dust that suspends in the air, emitted 
by production process of industry—includes dust from refractory material of iron and steel, coke-
screening systems, lime kilns, and cement production. 
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providing a number that represents pollution that is more recent.  The importance of other 
aspects of environmental pollution is not being disregarded; however, the available 
environmental data from China is limited thus the selection for this research was limited to 
availability.  Comparatively, air pollution emission is more likely to decrease before water 
pollution due to the immediate effects.  Many people notice air pollution more easily than water 
pollution due to its ubiquitous presence.  Additionally, air pollution has been getting aggressively 
worse in urban areas as the number of motor vehicles has increased.  Ceteris paribus, the 
ubiquitous presence and escalation in air pollution leads to the hypothesis that air pollution will 
be resolved before water pollution.  The challenges in determining a resolution for environmental 
problems causes a problem in testing the hypothesis.  However, in review of Beijing’s case study 
it can be determined that the government is proactively addressing the problem.  In addition to a 
car ban, Beijing injected the atmosphere with iodide52 to fabricate precipitation.  This was used 
as a temporary solution to clear the air of pollution.  The pollutants saturated the clouds and 
travels with the precipitation polluting the water system.53  Therefore, currently, it is safe to 
conclude that a solution to air pollution seems more likely than water pollution. Therefore a 
decrease in environmental emissions related to industry in urban areas should transpire in the 
collected data suggesting environmental education and awareness has positively affected 
environmental policy.   
Although urban areas have protested the government concerning environmental 
problems, there is question concerning the effectiveness of protests on officials and industrial 
                                                 
52 This technology is referred to as cloud seeding.  The introduction of silver iodide into the 
atmosphere creates clouds, as silver iodide serves as nuclei. Beijing claims to seed clouds so that 
no rain occurred during the opening and closing ceremonies; however, an additional objective 
was clearing the air of pollution.   
53 "Scientists 'cause' Beijing Snow," BBC News (Nov. 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8337337.stm>. 
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companies.  In her book The River Runs Black, Elizabeth Economy addresses the failure of 
polluting companies to compromise and the lack of management from local and national 
government officials.  Elizabeth Economy uses Tangshan city as an example of company 
inflexibility in the case of interaction with local officials.  Residents of Tangshan were 
experiencing headaches, nausea, rashes, and insomnia due to air pollution from Tongda Rubber.  
Rather than sympathy from local officials, protestors were pressured to end protest or lose their 
jobs.54  This introduces two important topics: the economic driven mindset of the nation and the 
significance of the relationship between businesses and the local government.  This issue will be 
further elaborated in Chapter 2.   
As more people learn about the harmful effect of pollution, and as environmental 
organizations share their knowledge and take action, social pressure continues to intensify and 
the citizens increasingly demand better environmental protection.  The growth of environmental 
consciousness as a result of health problems is more likely to cause social unrest compared to 
desiring better living conditions.  Once the central government is informed about the problem, 
the central government must respond otherwise social unrest would continue.  The response has 
normally been by punishing the local official in charge of the project.  The utilization of local 
government as a scapegoat allows the central government to respond differently and slower to 
the environmental demands.   Along with domestic pressure, international regimes can also 
pressure the national government, especially financially, as will be further discussed in Chapter 
4.  These pressures facilitated the environmental management transition (SEPA to MEP) in 2008.  
National reduction in emission levels should occur; however, due to the lag in national action, 
the data collected may not be in the correct time frame to represent the gradual shift towards an 
environmental-oriented management system.  
                                                 
54 Economy, 85.  
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Data & Analysis 
This paper uses a comparison across provinces by examining the way a single province 
manages environmental emission compared to other provinces.  Rather than analyzing raw 
numbers, this research adjust and discharge volumes by GDP, to allow a comparison adjusted to 
incorporate industrial and economic growth of the regions.  The method of normalizing the data 
in this research involved subtracting percent emission discharged from percent GDP.  However, 
this calculation assumes that GDP signifies the amount of emissions because GDP is dependent 
on industry, and as industry rises or falls, emission rates will rise and fall.55  As a result, negative 
numbers suggest that the province comparatively produces more pollution than GDP, and a 
positive number would imply that there is more industrial production than pollution.  
Furthermore, the assumption is made that provinces with a higher population density have more 
urban centers than provinces with lower population density because population density calculates 
the number of person per square kilometer.  The area of the province is normalized; therefore, a 
province with more urban centers would have a higher population density than a province with 
no urban centers; this supports the method of calculating urban areas and social pressure by 
proxy by population density.    
Ideally, this thesis would encompass data that indicates complaints over time increasing; 
however, due to limited data this was not feasible.  An alternative was the number of reported 
cases per a province, available data received from Ben Van Rooij was only limited with 2001, 
                                                 
55 In Tun-jen Cheng’s data on the energy industry can be extrapolated to represent the over 
industrial relationship with the environment as he states that petrochemical, steel, and 
metallurgical industries are industries watched by the SEPA alongside the electricity industry.  
Moreover, Tun-jen Cheng’s study reports 80 percent of power generated comes from thermal 
power plants, which produces a large proportion of air and water pollution.   
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2003, and 2006.  Table 3.4 consists of the number of reported cases and does not suggest a trend 
nor a categorical decrease or increase.  There was no statistical significance between the number 
of complaints and any industrial pollution.   This indicates social pressure is not a result from the 
ambient pollution.      
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Table 3.1: Percent GDP - Percent Waste Gas 
Emission  
Regions 1997 1999 2004 2005 
Beijing -1.45 -0.63 3.68 2.17 
Tianjin -0.50 -0.04 1.29 0.16 
Hebei -4.05 -3.33 -2.10 -4.75 
Shanxi -3.35 -3.71 -2.65 -3.52 
Inner Mongolia -2.86 -2.91 -3.16 -2.52 
Liaoning -2.70 -0.65 0.06 -3.72 
Jilin 0.01 1.09 0.77 -0.01 
Heilongjiang -2.42 -1.82 1.85 0.83 
Shanghai -1.88 -1.50 2.98 1.47 
Jiangsu -3.00 -3.23 4.95 1.75 
Zhejiang 2.18 2.11 4.73 1.95 
Anhui 0.60 1.55 1.45 0.13 
Fujian 0.77 0.58 2.67 0.99 
Jiangxi -0.07 0.10 1.20 0.42 
Shandong -4.12 -3.97 3.89 0.39 
Henan -2.96 -2.28 1.58 -0.41 
Hubei -1.33 -1.63 0.95 -0.20 
Hunan -0.34 -0.04 2.35 1.06 
Guangdong 1.44 1.37 10.37 6.31 
Guangxi -1.76 -1.85 -1.64 -1.04 
Hainan 0.06 0.12 0.40 0.11 
Chongqing -0.85 -0.22 0.74 0.19 
Sichuan -1.49 -0.61 2.15 0.71 
Guizhou -1.36 -2.28 -0.37 -0.43 
Yunnan -0.29 -0.25 0.48 -0.27 
Xizang 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.12 
Shaanxi -1.15 -0.61 0.79 0.03 
Gansu -1.68 -1.32 -0.15 -0.60 
Qinghai -0.28 -0.28 -0.13 -0.23 
Ningxia -0.79 -0.67 -0.54 -0.75 
Xinjiang -0.62 -0.48 0.23 -0.35 
AVG -1.17 -0.88 1.26 0.00 
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Table 3.2: Percent GDP - Percent Waste Water 
Emission  
Regions 1997 1999 2004 2005 
Beijing -0.43 0.38 2.17 0.70 
Tianjin -0.04 0.48 1.03 0.22 
Hebei -0.73 -1.14 3.47 1.82 
Shanxi -1.00 -0.91 1.62 0.78 
Inner Mongolia -0.43 -0.11 1.46 0.90 
Liaoning -0.94 0.48 -0.48 -2.26 
Jilin 0.72 1.50 0.71 0.02 
Heilongjiang -2.25 -1.34 0.84 -0.38 
Shanghai -2.87 -1.91 0.94 -1.41 
Jiangsu -6.52 -6.83 3.53 0.38 
Zhejiang 1.24 0.45 4.71 1.44 
Anhui -0.04 1.23 0.31 -0.81 
Fujian -0.52 -0.30 2.22 0.81 
Jiangxi -1.39 -0.52 0.09 -0.98 
Shandong -1.71 -1.67 7.12 3.84 
Henan -2.00 -1.61 2.99 1.28 
Hubei -3.69 -3.11 -1.37 -2.77 
Hunan -4.39 -3.44 0.11 -1.42 
Guangdong 0.84 1.21 2.47 -1.50 
Guangxi -2.49 -2.81 -0.64 -0.97 
Hainan -0.05 0.03 0.16 -0.07 
Chongqing -0.92 -3.34 0.57 -0.03 
Sichuan -2.95 -1.71 1.52 -0.23 
Guizhou -0.78 -0.56 -0.28 -0.11 
Yunnan -0.73 -0.34 1.31 0.48 
Xizang -0.06 -0.03 NA -0.02 
Shaanxi -0.38 -0.36 1.35 0.43 
Gansu -1.15 -0.72 0.17 -0.01 
Qinghai -0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 
Ningxia -0.27 -0.25 -0.15 -0.30 
Xinjiang -0.05 0.11 0.88 0.30 
AVG -1.16 -0.88 1.30 0.00 
Dang- 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Percent GDP -Percent Industrial 
Dust Emission  
Regions 1997 1999 2004 2005 
Beijing 0.24 0.95 4.63 3.12 
Tianjin 0.50 1.02 2.37 1.66 
Hebei -3.47 -3.93 -0.97 -2.72 
Shanxi -3.08 -4.00 -4.47 -5.52 
Inner Mongolia -3.09 -0.39 -1.43 -3.04 
Liaoning -1.11 2.50 1.73 -0.92 
Jilin 1.07 2.32 1.40 0.33 
Heilongjiang -1.11 0.38 2.66 1.43 
Shanghai 1.52 2.06 6.51 4.51 
Jiangsu 0.13 -0.55 8.54 5.36 
Zhejiang 1.95 0.51 5.99 4.26 
Anhui -0.13 0.61 -1.14 -2.35 
Fujian -1.42 -0.80 2.85 1.20 
Jiangxi -1.24 -1.41 -1.04 -1.79 
Shandong -2.93 -2.90 8.06 5.27 
Henan -4.95 -5.35 -0.86 -2.37 
Hubei -1.73 -1.36 0.87 -0.41 
Hunan -2.24 -3.72 -3.34 -5.15 
Guangdong 0.24 -1.01 11.29 7.79 
Guangxi -3.23 -2.28 -2.81 -4.04 
Hainan -0.19 0.21 0.54 0.33 
Chongqing -1.52 -0.33 -0.20 -0.79 
Sichuan -2.07 -2.58 0.45 -0.48 
Guizhou -1.81 -3.36 -1.36 -1.10 
Yunnan -0.38 -0.46 1.20 0.05 
Xizang 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.11 
Shaanxi -2.72 -2.12 -1.28 -1.87 
Gansu -1.09 -0.49 -0.29 -0.84 
Qinghai -0.40 -0.35 -0.53 -0.75 
Ningxia -0.74 -0.48 -0.53 -0.68 
Xinjiang -1.21 -0.06 1.83 -0.58 
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AVG -1.17 -0.88 1.32 0.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Provincial Cases and Complaints 
Province 
Cases 
2006 
Cases 
2003 
Cases 
2001 
Complaints 
2006 
Beijing 1858 451 737 12803 
Tianjin 988 1193 957 17384 
Hebei 6039 2920 3129 16868 
Shanxi 6713 1614 1510 5847 
Neimenggu 1402 980 964 7912 
Liaoning 9540 31016 16846 27520 
Jilin 220 827 757 16379 
Heilongjiang 1982 4319 4647 13148 
Shanghai 1165 2295 1557 76385 
Jiangsu 7538 5782 5480 61459 
Zhejiang 9806 5928 6842 39046 
Anhui 1219 1811 1866 10315 
Fujian 3707 4445 2689 20763 
Jiangxi 1475 1193 717 7989 
Shandong 6421 3427 3375 36291 
Henan 3403 4900 3238 8267 
Hubei 1957 2720  18197 
Hunan 2041 2211 2673 15155 
Guangdong 6619 3017 4814 68800 
Guangxi 934 703 1010 17128 
Hainan 77 33 114 2230 
Chongqing 2659 1846 938 38707 
Sichuan 5771 5038 1919 27299 
Guizhou 181 444 280 5022 
Yunnan 2268 533 378 8278 
Xizang 3 4 7 1494 
Shaanxi 1680 1394 1869 7882 
Gansu 1171 740 713 7903 
Qinghai 8 61 58 398 
Ningxia 431 101 325 4958 
Xinjiang 3128 872 683 6987 
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The first hypothesis stated there would be a decrease in emission rates in response to the 
increase in social pressure.  The data in Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 all suggests a similar average 
trend line with a positive relationship supporting the hypothesis.  The positive relation indicates 
industrial emissions becoming lower than industrial production.   This confirms China’s 
proactive environmental practices occurring before the installment of MEP, which is expected 
because if no change occurred production and emissions would jointly increase.  However, due 
to the shortage of data it is undetermined as to when China became proactive with environmental 
protection. 
The second hypothesis stated air emissions should decrease before water discharge; 
however, the data demonstrated otherwise.  By 2005, the percent difference from GDP and waste 
gas emission has 12 negative regions, wastewater has 17 negative regions, and industrial dust has 
18 negative regions. On the surface, the data do not provide any confirmation of the hypothesis.  
Upon closer examination the gap in the negative regions are much larger in industrial dust and 
industrial gas emissions, 5.52 and 4.75 respectively, whereas the data on wastewater discharge 
have a smaller range and correspond more with level of industrial production emission rate.   
Population density does not correspond with GDP because the p-value is greater than the 
0.05 alpha level, and thus we cannot grant statistical significance to these differences.  However, 
this does not mean that they are not worth noting.  There is no statistical significance between 
population density and percent difference of GDP and waste gas, wastewater, or industrial dust 
emissions.  This means that population density does not determine the level of emission for the 
areas. However, calculations show that population density does statistically significantly 
correlate with the number of complaints (Pearson correlation 0.676, P= 0.000).  This provides 
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statistical support for the appropriateness of substitution of population density for social 
pressure.  
The data did raise questions for future researchers.  The data for 2004 suggests a high 
spike in every region, an increase in the difference of percent GDP and percent emission.  This 
may be due to a spike in production.   
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Chapter 4: Economics 
 
 
 
The shift from SEPA to MEP did not remove pro-development priority in China.  Instead, 
it moved environmental protection to an “equal” level of importance.  Therefore, GDP overall 
and per region should increase over time.  The economic independence from factories, the 
citizens’ desire to improve living conditions, and the local government influence and corruption 
determine the social pressure exerted on the government.  The government’s relationship with 
industries and the relationship between industries and employees influences the local 
governments willingness to sanction industries.  Environmental protection’s new priority was a 
result of the socio-economic pressure exerted that did not hinder economic growth nationally and 
regionally.  
The rise in economic development caused changes on local and national levels that 
further pushed the central-state to promote the SEPA to MEP.   At the national level, the 
economy expanded, resulting in the expansion of the middle economic class.  This chapter uses 
poverty levels and bettered living conditions to confirm the expansion of the middle class, which 
has environmental demands unlike the lower economic class.  The reaction to environmentally 
induced health problems further demonstrates environmental demands from the middle and the 
Wuhan case study explores the relationship between environmental investments and economic 
growth.  However, the most local level response to economic growth differed because at the 
local level economic development created a stronger focus on economic development.  The drive 
in economic development is evident in the intertwined relationship of industry and economy, and 
corruption.    
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Improved Living Conditions  
 
Economic development generally results in the rise in standard of living, and naturally, 
changing the economic dynamics of the society.  In China’s case, the middle class expanded; the 
expansion of the middle class resulted in a change in expectations.  Prior to the development, 
many Chinese were focused on subsistence.56  Thus, as people received the luxury of survival, 
the Chinese middle class became more issue oriented.  Their immediate attention was on their 
surrounding environment.   
China’s GDP over the 1978 to 1998 decade has increased by 9.6 percent.57  This 
economic growth confirms China’s long established pro-development approach.  The pro-
development mentality has not changed during the move towards promoting environmental 
protection at the ministerial level.  The Gross Regional Product (GRP) for China from 2001 to 
2005 increased from 72151.69 RMB to 1454.7 RMB, and the GDP from 1991 to 2001 increased 
from 64510.08 to 114574.70, respectively.   On its own, China’s income does not signify the 
country’s attitude on environmental protection.  The GRP increase only suggests the economic 
development and the total investment in treatment of pollution which also increased; together 
these represent China attempting to balance the two responsibilities.  
Additional variance in the Central and Western region and the Eastern region that 
impacts the governance of environmental protection are poverty levels.  Joseph Cheng points out 
in a 1992 survey, 80 million of China’s population was living in poverty and 76.8 percent of 
them resided within central and western regions.  The relationship between industrial 
development in central and western regions and the poverty levels are not indicative of a direct 
                                                 
56 Deduced from poverty levels in China that can be found in Poverty and Quality of Life: A 
Perspective (1972) 
57 China: Air, Land, and Water, 1. 
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relationship.  However, the aforementioned industries in central and western regions have a 
slower economic growth than the industries in the eastern region (which is comprised of mainly 
foreign investments and manufacturing based industry).  The poverty levels in these regions 
provide an indication of the province’s living standards because the level of poverty and income 
per capita is used to calculate the standard of living, and, in this case, the assumption that the 
presence of poverty indicates low income levels.58  Additionally, the poverty level and living 
standard follows the same trend as it was noted by Benewick that, “In 1997, the living standards 
were lowest in the western region and highest on the eastern region.”59   Thus, it would be 
acceptable to postulate provinces’ general income level signified by its poverty levels.  As a 
result, the central and western regions would also have lower standard of living.  Economy also 
defends environmental degradation being a source of economic instability by mentioning the 
Central Committee’s organization department reporting an increase in protest60 over 
environmental disputes.61 The lower standard of living is critical in one explanation of Eastern 
regions reportedly having more sanctions and higher fines.  Further supporting the regional 
economic gap produced from pro-development efforts will affect state environmental funding.  
The standard of living influences the local populations’ reaction to the local industries.  Higher 
standard of living typically indicates that the population is more willing to speak out against 
pollution, and vice versa, a lower standard of living or higher poverty rate will result in less 
public outcry (in this case willingness to speak is measured by the number of sanctions).  Thus, 
                                                 
58 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare Office of Education, Jerry E. Stockdale 
presents Poverty and Quality of Life: A Perspective (1972) 
<http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/3b/3f/
75.pdf>. 
59 Benewick, (p. 24)    
60 Economy, 87. 
61 Economy notes that China’s minister of public security stated openly, “Incidents [that] broke 
out over disputes over forest, grasslands, and mineral resources” are among “four factors in 
social instability” (p.88). 
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higher standard of living would aggravate social pressure described in Chapter 1.  However, 
there are cases that deviate from the mentioned trend.  For example, environmental pollution that 
impacts a large population or results in extreme conditions can elicit a local response even if 
poverty levels are high.  Regardless, it is more likely that areas of low poverty and high living 
standards speak out against environmental pollution in order to maintain their high living 
conditions. Furthermore, the environmental pollution has worsened in the central and western 
regions due to its common industries.62  As economic development continues, the national 
government will begin to expand its investment in necessary political and financial capital to 
develop an effective incentive system,63 and will have to reevaluate their old motto, “develop 
first, then cleanup.”64  
It is undisputed that China’s middle class has grown significantly as has the national 
economy.  The economic growth benefited the lower class and shifted the population towards a 
large middle class.  The economic advancement also improved living conditions; in China, the 
slight advancement drastically raised the living standards.  This is evident in Vaclav Smil 
calculations of living standards in China with the use of applicable material affluence such as, 
“the ownership of washing machines (less than ten per one hundred people in 1990) and 
refrigerators (a mere three per one hundred), but TV set purchases rose rapidly during the 1980s, 
reaching the rate of sixteen per one hundred in 1990.”65  The increase in purchased luxury items 
such as a television set indicates a change in lifestyle.  With the rise in economic power, people 
                                                 
62 Cheng, 10. 
63 In her work, Elizabeth Economy states that China has both a weak incentive system and 
enforcement apparatus for environmental protection.  A better incentive system would include 
a tax incentive or financial assistance to companies who are implementing the environmental 
policies.  
64 Economy, 218. 
65 Vaclav Smil, China's Environmental Crisis: an Inquiry into the Limits of National Development, 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 95. 
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are able to focus their resources on comfortable concerns, rather than worrying about survival.  
The rise of the middle economic class has resulted in a shift in the dynamics of the population’s 
wants and needs.  Simply due to size, the middle class has expanded in power, and has gained an 
influential stance on China’s environmental protection and policy.  If the middle class chose to 
voice their opinion, it could quickly pick up momentum.  Further evidence of middle class power 
can be seen in neighboring states, which have experienced similar rise in the numbers of their 
middle class citizens, in the 1980s.  As the Thai’s middle class grew so did their concern over the 
environment.  Consequently, the number of environmental groups blossomed throughout 
Thailand and forced the military government opened up to participation in environmental 
issues.66  The central government of China recognizes the rise of the middle class and the power 
in numbers, and thus pays close attention to this new generation.   
Additional evidence of middle class expansion is the decrease in poverty levels.  The 
State of China Atlas states, “In 1978, over 270 million Chinese people were living in poverty.  
By 1996, the World Bank reported this figure had been reduced to 90 million.”67 The decrease in 
poverty levels signifies the move towards a more comfortable lifestyle.  However, this creates an 
environment of false security because as wealth increases so do the chances of pollution induced 
health problems.  Moreover, as living conditions better, the people who benefited do not desire 
their area of residence to succumb to lower environmental standards.  Instead, people have 
higher standards due to experiencing better environmental conditions or learning about the health 
harm of pollution.  Thus, they quest for a better life that incorporates high-quality environmental 
conditions and economic success.   
                                                 
66 Economy, 244. 
67 Robert Benewick and Stephanie Donald, The State of China Atlas (London: Penguin, 1999), 25.   
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Moreover, environmental pollution has inflicted medical problems on the people 
surrounding the source of pollution.68  The medical problems have ranged from headaches to 
cancer.  Often a specific medical problem is hard to associate with pollution because each 
person’s body reacts differently to the pollutant.  However, when examined residents of a 
polluted area exhibit health problems that occur repeatedly.  China lacks national records of 
environment-related health statistics; therefore, research provided by Elizabeth Economy will be 
used in substitute.  Two cases from Economy’s composition are the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) and Baiyangdian’s water pollution.  In 2003, the SARS epidemic caused a 
national panic and a death toll of 646 in China (including Hong Kong).69  This incident did not 
originate from pollution, but poor environmental management aggravated the problem.  
Improper disposal of medical waste and city pollution increased the chance of exposure to 
SARS.70  In Baiyangdian, water pollution caused an increase in liver and esophageal cancer rates 
in the region to be three times more than areas with clean water.71 Public health problems are 
another element that alarms locals and encourages protest.  
Further proof of economic development resulting in environmental actions is the 
occurrence of areas with higher gross domestic product (GDP) that are more inclined to report 
sanctions than areas with low GDPs.  Table 3.1features the top five provinces with the highest 
GDP and the five lowest five provinces with the lowest GDP.  In his article The Inequality of 
Regional Economic Development in China between 1991 and 2001, J.T. Huang concludes that 
before 1994 the top five provinces were Guangdong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan, and Jilin.  The 
                                                 
68 Health problems induced by pollution are a global occurrence.  Elizabeth Economy has 
further defined it to occur in China. 
69 "SARS: Global Hotspots." BBC News ( July 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2969247.stm>. 
70 Economy, 84. 
71 Ibid. 
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top five highest GDP provinces have been consistent, with the exception of Anhui replacing Jilin 
in 1996 and Chongqing split from Sichuan resulting in Shandong replacing Sichuan in 1997.72  
In Van Rooij’s data, all three years (2006, 2003, and 2001) the top three provinces with reported 
cases consisted of Liaoning, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu.73  Huang’s data juxtaposition by Van Rooij, 
illustrates the positive relationship between GDP per province and cases reported per province.  
The numbers of sanctions increased in provinces with higher GDP; therefore, the higher the GDP 
in a province the more likely the province will sanction a company for environmental pollution.  
As the national GDP increased there has been an increase in national environmental 
investment, this is also applicable on a smaller scale in Wuhan, Hubei.  Wuhan’s geographic 
position in central China and at the confluence of two large rivers—Yangtze River and Haishui 
River— led it to become one of the largest cities in China.  The available water supply supported 
the city’s history, economy, and growth as the economic center of China.  Under communism, 
Wuhan became a large steel and manufacturing industry sector, and in 1990s, it further expanded 
its industry and foreign investment becoming one of China’s industrial bases.  From 1992 to 
1999, Wuhan’s annual economic growth rate has averaged 16%.74  As the economy climbed in 
Wuhan, the environment declined.  Robbie Ali notes that as “Wuhan’s economic growth, foreign 
investment, and population have all grown rapidly… the most dramatic rise of all is the number 
of motor vehicles in the city.”75  By 2007, there were approximately 750,000 cars, which is 200 
times more than 50 years before, resulting in heavy air pollution.76  In addition to car pollution, 
industrial emission has polluted the city’s air and water.  Industrial and municipal waste heavily 
                                                 
72 Huang 
73 Van Rooij 
74 Robbie Ali and Hong Zhao, "Wuhan, China and Pittsburgh, USA: Urban Environmental Health 
Past, Present, and Future."(EcoHealth 5.2: 2008), 161. 
75 Ali, 162. 
76 Ali, 162. 
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polluted the water as the population and economy continued to grow.  Economic growth 
encouraged industrial growth, when left unchecked, massively polluted the city of Wuhan; this 
relationship between economic growth and environment is common.  Furthermore, in his study, 
Feng Wu notes that along with economic growth there was more money being invested towards 
environmental technology and research and remediation.  From 1999-2002, Wuhan’s GDP has 
increased 12-13 percent, and in 2002, Wuhan’s reported GDP was 149.3 billion Renminbi (18.48 
billion USD) an 11.8 percent increase from 2001.77  More specifically, in 2000, environmental 
investments in Wuhan increased 2 percent and since 2001, 2.5 percent yearly.78  Wu’s data 
clearly denotes a trend between GDP and environmental investment, is indicative to the external 
demands influencing environmental protection most likely stemming from the middle class 
citizens.   
Local Economic Conditions  
 
On a macro-scale, it can be easily concluded that environmental management has 
increased; however, on a local scale economic factors are more significant in environmental 
engagement.  The relationship between industries and the local economy can control the local 
government’s willingness to sanction industries because local governments prefer economic 
development.  Moreover, the socio-economics of an area inhibits not only the local government, 
but also local citizens from reporting environmental pollution.  On the local-scale, the marriage 
of pro-development priority and environmental protection priority has not been as consistent.  
The lack of consistency from province to province is a result of differing local economic 
                                                 
77 Feng Wu, Zhan Li, Nansheng Deng, and Jinbao Wei. "Economic Development and Eco-
Environment Protection in Central China-the Case of Wuhan City." (Fresenius Environmental 
Bulletin 14.11: 2005), 1077. 
78 Feng Wu, 1078. 
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conditions, which are reliant on economic independence, local government endeavors, and 
national government connections. 
Economic independence affects the “ability” of local governments to freely report and 
sanction industries.  Economic independence is the ability to progress economically without a 
heavy local industry influence.  If a local industry influences the local economy’s development, 
it creates a dependency.  The local government would try to keep the industry thriving in order 
for personal benefits.  Thus, a dependent local economy would most likely have the local 
government preventing economic stagnation by not holding industries accountable which would 
hurt the local economy.  
Economic independence on a more personal basis would be socio-economic conditions, 
which, in turn perpetuates an economic dependence between industries and the local citizens.  It 
has been documented that industrial employers can offer benefits to attract and keep workers, 
such as reimbursements of medical and social services, an old age pension, subsidies, and highly 
subsidized housing.  Subsidized housing in urban areas is the most important examples because 
it enables workers to find a job in urban China.79 However, these benefits often tie workers to the 
company resulting in lifetime employment.  This lifestyle occurred in the mid-1990s, when 
reformers tried to improve functions of markets for goods and services by dismantling the 
communist foundation,80 and reviving the hukou system.81  The hukou system categorized people 
as urban or rural residents, which gave priority to urban industrialization (or urban hukou).  
Without categorization as an urban hukou finding a job or housing in urban China was 
impossible.  The mother hands down the urban hukou title, which was viewed as a ticket to a 
                                                 
79 Björn Gustafsson, Shi Li, and Terry Sicular, Inequality and Public Policy in China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2008), 6. 
80 Or the system of administrative planning and pricing. 
81 Household registration system   
Dang- 48 
 
better life.  This system created an advantage for the industries as workers felt tied to their work 
units for the benefits, and was a large impediment for workers to complain about illegal 
pollution.   
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Local Governments and Corruption  
 
Environmental problems that occur in most regions are a result of corruption and local 
governments’ priority on economic development.  The local government often prioritizes 
economic growth over environmental protection due to national priorities and reward (refer to 
Chapter 2).82  Another local deterrent towards environmental protection is corruption; polluters 
found it more in their financial interest to bribe local officials rather than comply with 
government regulations.83  
Comparing the environmental protection agency of the United States and China provides 
a better understanding as to how corruption can occur. As mentioned, in March of 2008, SEPA 
was promoted to the national level as the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s 
Republic of China (MEP).  The United States sent scientists and lawyers to assist the MEP in the 
organizing regional offices in the same arrangement as the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).  However, the EPA has over 17,000 employees, whereas MEP only has 300 workers in 
Beijing and 30 people for each region.84  Moreover, China, a unitary system, does not allow for 
the same environmental policy implementation as the United States.  Rather, China’s central 
government issues Five-Year Plans that set goals for local governments.  Additionally, Chinese 
government officials are employed under a system that in which promotions and job retention are 
based on the success of local areas meeting the economic goals established in the Five-Year 
Plans.  This places pressure on the officials that leads to adjustments in information and data to 
impress the officials above and ensure job security.  An additional difference between MEP and 
EPA occurs in their regional offices; employees paid by the local government occupy MEP’s 
                                                 
82 Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, "Regional Difference and Sustainable Development in China," Journal 
of Chinese Political Science 5.1, (1999), 6. 
83 Joseph Cheng, 6. 
84
 Naomi Lubick, "Will the Dragon Stay GREEN? China after the Beijing Olympics," Academic Search Complete. 
Environnemental Science & Technology (2008) <http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1021/es087183q>.  
Dang- 51 
 
offices, which render MEP’s regional employees powerless environmental protection officers, 
and the MEP’s regional offices lack a legal basis.85 This is not the case in America; EPA’s 
regional offices all have the power to enforce environmental violations.  The tension of China’s 
power structure (refer to Chapter 2) comes into play at the municipal-level; an official has two 
bosses: the mayor and provincial higher-ups.  The mayor has control of the municipal-level 
official’s budget, staff size, and employment.  However, the mayor is responsible to maintain 
economic growth as well.  Typically, environmental regulations become secondary to the mayor 
because economic success dictates job retention more than environmental success and this also 
remains true for provincial higher up.  China’s multilayered system with its convoluted routes of 
communication is also expandable to the environmental sector generating inefficiency and 
delaying central-level efforts at environmental protection.  These differences between EPA and 
MEP hinder China from immediate success in environmental protection.  
Before the MEP’s creations, the SEPA was at the top of environmental bureaucracy.  The 
administration did not have rank “in the nomenclature system of the party-state.”86  In addition to 
the confusing system, the SEPA was understaffed and underfunded and so were the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  The NDRC encountered challenges due to 
understaffed offices that resulted in the inability to review of projects thoroughly; slipshod work 
resulted in approval of projects that did not meet environmental standards.87  The SEPA 
experienced similar problems that produced less thorough reviews and less evaluated companies 
regarding environmental standards.   The political atmosphere changes geographically by coastal 
proximity and regionally, thereby making comprehending the Chinese government structure a 
key component to explain the regional differences that will be discussed.  
                                                 
85 Lubick, “Will the Dragon Stay GREEN? China after the Beijing Olympics.” 
86 Tun-Jen Cheng, 122. 
87 Tun-Jen Cheng, 122. 
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The Three Gorges Dam provides an example of corruption that has occurred in attempt to 
gain economic prosperity.  China undertook this project as an energy alternative that would also 
mitigate flooding.  In 1998, nearly 100 cases of corruption, bribery, and embezzlement were 
reported.88 Sixteen of 95 cases were related to actual construction of the dam; however, most 
cases involved officials embezzling funds intended for resettlement of residents.89  One of the 
most controversial corruption scandals in the Three Gorges Dam project was the displacement of 
people with inadequate compensation. 90  This controversy led to a halt in funding from foreign 
countries and agencies.  For example, the World Bank, initially, was to fund the Three Gorges 
Dam project; however, with pressure from human rights groups, the World Bank pulled support 
from the project.  The large quantity of residents forced to resettle attracted national attention 
when numerous residents began to report that promised funds were not being distributed and that 
non-arable land was being given to the farmers.   
As domestic pressure increased in the corruption of this environmental project, the 
government is forced to respond, often by reprimanding local officials responsible.  One example 
of corruption in this environmental affair can be seen in the case of the steel bridge that collapsed 
in 1999 at Qijiang due to misaligned steel pipes and plates in the bridge’s suspension that created 
dangerous fault lines. Soon after, a local official was arrested after allegedly taking a bribe of 
more than 100,000 Renmenbi (RMB) from an unqualified contractor responsible for the 
construction of the bridge.91  In 2000, Dai Lansheng was charged with embezzling billions of 
RMB from the Three Gorges Dam project after importing dilapidated, used construction 
                                                 
88 John Gittings, "Corruption brings fear for safety of China's Three Gorges dam," Gaurdian.co.uk 
(1999) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/jan/19/johngittings>. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Bruce Kennedy, "China's Three Gorges Dam," CNN (1999) 
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/asian.superpower/three.gorges/>. 
Dang- 53 
 
equipment, instead of new, fully functioning machinery. The fraud came to light after dam 
workers complained that the 20 year-old vehicles did not work properly and incurred costly 
repairs. One third of 122 million USD that Dai charged to his company for the secondhand 
purchases remains unaccounted for.92  Dai and the collapsed steel bridge are just two of the 
reported corruption cases that occurred during the construction of the Three Gorges Dam.  This 
provides evidence that local officials ultimately decide the degree of environmental stringency 
for the province, regardless of industrial relationship.   
An additional consequence worth noting is that corruption and social uprising turn efforts 
away from the dam and to politics.  The effort that officials could have spent on supervising the 
Three Gorges Dam project was instead used finding and prosecuting corrupt officials.  
Additionally, officials also wasted energy in addressing the corruption, criticism from 
international communities, and ameliorating the financial situation.  When the money financed 
for the project was misallocated, subpar supplies and human capital were utilized rather than 
qualified personnel and material that resulted in inadequate construction.  Such deviation can 
impede the environmental benefits of the Three Gorges Dam and further environmental 
degradation.  Moreover, the eventual shortage in supervision of the Three Gorges Dam is a 
problem that Chinese environmental bureaucracy shares.   
Another catalyst for corruption at the local level is economic growth.  In 2002, China 
entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) and registered a double-digit economic growth 
rate.  The expansion in growth only encouraged political elites to help firms illegally acquire 
                                                 
92
 Lisa Perryman, "Three Gorges dam is black hole of corruption," Probe International (2000) 
<http://www.probeinternational.org/three-gorges-probe/three-gorges-dam-black-hole-corruption-says-chinese-
journalist>. 
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permits to further their political and economic agendas.93  A main driver for local political elites 
to encourage growth in their area of governance is that there are incentives.  However, in 
combination with the government’s organization and national economic drive, cases of extra 
permits or unapproved completed projects not easily distinguished.  Thus, overseeing bodies, 
such as the SEPA, will report violations of laws and regulations.  These violations were able to 
occur during the initial phase because of “benign neglect or tacit support of local level regulators 
and local government.”94 
Tun-Jen Cheng provides a further element to consider—government connections.  
Provinces can establish government connection in many different manners; one measurable 
method is the number of seats held in China’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC).  The legislature body is now in theory, de facto, the most powerful decision making body 
because it has the ability to amend the constitution, supervise enforcement, enact basic laws of 
the state, and elect leading personnel—including President and Vice President.95  It was not until 
1978 that the NPC were entitled to the enumerated powers.96  The number of seats a province 
holds is important because it represents the amount of national power the province holds.   Tun-
Jen Cheng’s research suggests the existence of a relationship between economic growth and the 
number of committee members from each province, and discovers “Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, and 
Henan rank extremely high in terms of economic growth rates, but do not seem to be able to 
advance more of their provincial cadres to the Central Committee than other provinces with 
                                                 
93 Tun-Jen Cheng, 123.  
94 Tun-Jen Cheng, 134. 
95 Luo, 9, 
96 Benewick, 48. 
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lackluster records.  On the other hand, these provinces do not seem to have been penalized for 
their rampant rent-seeking activities.”97     
China’s infrastructure has responded to the economic development.  The change in 
infrastructure resulted in the promotion to ministerial level.  However, in this period of transition 
the changes provide more opportunities for corruption.  Additionally, the change in the social 
dynamics, which resulted in the growth in the middle class, has placed pressure on government 
leaders to implement better environmental practices.  Economic development has provided a 
catalyst for environmental change; however, only time will tell if MEP will meet the new 
demands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Tun-Jen Cheng, 137.  
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Chapter 5: Financial Investments 
 
 
 
 The Chinese national government allocates a budget for investment in the treatment of 
industrial pollution; however, the total funds are not compiled solely from the central state, but 
also from fundraising, loans, and foreign investors.  The investments are aimed at harnessing the 
source of industrial pollution and constructing of urban facilities with an environment-friendly 
infrastructure.98  In this chapter the hypothesis examined is that environmental protection being 
promoted to the ministerial level should convey investments pertaining to environmental 
protection increasing over time—both from domestic and international sources.   
The increase in awareness of industrial pollution and pressure on the central government 
should result in an increase in the budget for treatment of pollution.  The increased budget should 
be reflective in the state budgets and foreign investments.  Additionally, aforementioned 
domestic social pressures have grown and increased demands for environmental protection; 
China’s allocated environmental budget should reflect the increased demands.  Foreign 
investments should increase because the knowledge of environmental pollution often travels to 
Chinese leaders through international meetings and foreign investments are already established 
in China.  Although economic development is recognized as has found a higher priority in 
China’s political agenda, developed nations had already began to prioritize environmental 
                                                 
98 "Appendix IV: Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators," Ministry of Environmental 
Protection of the People's Republic of China (2007) 
<http://english.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/EnvironmentalStatistics/yearbook2006/200712/t20
071217_114397.htm>. 
Dang- 57 
 
protection.  Thus, it is a changing norm that foreign organizations and companies place 
investment to provide additional support in greening China.   
Thus, this chapter analyzes the investment in treatment of industrial pollution in two 
categories: the total budget and the foreign investments.  It is hypothesized that the total 
environmental budget should also increase with the total investment and social pressure.  
However, this budget will not be evenly divided among regions due to the drive in economic 
growth suggesting a biased method of distribution of environmental funds.  If total investments 
increase then foreign investments will also increase because foreign investors have demanded 
environmental standards on purchased products.  Foreign pressure strongly advocates 
environmental protection and in turn provokes an environmental legislation in China.  Foreign 
pressures are evident in the 2008 Olympic Games case study and adoption of ISO 14001.   
State Environmental Budget 
 
The national government’s investments, such as the investment in the treatment of 
industrial pollution, are divided among the provinces; however, the funds are not distributed 
equally.  Rather, the national government investments division depends on the rate of return on 
investments.  Chapter 1 mentions the Chinese government placing economic growth at the 
forefront of the political agenda; thus, it is expected that the government will focus its attention 
on the areas that are more economically successful.  Thus, it is hypothesized that along with the 
increase in the total investment for industrial pollution treatment investments in each region 
should also be reflective of the regional economic success.  Furthermore, this preference is a 
result of the regional economic gap, where more central and eastern provinces are invested in 
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than western provinces by the national government.  This regional economic gap should remain 
consistent with the state’s environmental budget for provinces.   
The data collected in Figure 4.1 supports the hypothesis; it suggests that the overall total 
investment in the treatment of industrial pollution has increased by almost two-fold from 2000 to 
2005.  Therefore, if the hypothesis holds true, then this would indicate that the regional 
investments should also increase respectively to each region’s economic success.  This is 
supported by the calculations that indicate total pollution investment and GDP, not calculated 
based on per capita, is statistically significant (Pearson correlation 0.827, Sig. 0.000).  This 
suggests that the economic success of regions is reflective in the total amount of investment in 
pollution treatment.  
Availability of natural resources also influences a province’s environmental funding.  The 
provinces with worse environmental conditions—in this case fewer natural resources and more 
industrially based provinces of the east—have a larger budget for investment in the treatment of 
industrial pollution than provinces with an abundance of natural resources.  The availability of 
natural resources determines the industrial strength and focus in each region.  The inequality in 
industrial sector among provinces further aggravates the regional economic gap.  China is one of 
the largest countries in terms of size, thus the wide variation in natural resources comes as no 
surprise.  The political and economic response to the different natural resources plays a large role 
in the outcome of environmental protection and policy.  As a result, provinces have differing 
rates of investment.    
  
Commonly known and noted by Joseph Cheng, “energy resources, raw materials, 
agricultural products, forests, and grasslands” are concentrated in the central and western 
regions.  Predictably, the eastern region turns to the central and western regions for energy and 
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raw material and converts the material to production.99  The eastern regions have a production 
based industry that differs in drastically in economic growth compared to the agricultural and 
natural resource based industry in the central and western regions.  The accessibility of the 
eastern provinces resulted in an economy with heavy investments from domestic and 
international investors.  The concentrated investments in the eastern region resulted in processing 
industry that produced profits quicker and at higher volumes; contrary to the mining, energy, and 
raw materials industrial sectors that have a low add value.100  Additionally, the national 
government has recently focused on promoting economic growth in central and western regions 
to reduce regional disparities in China.101    
The natural resource not only determines the industry for a region, but also the level of 
economic development for a region.  As Joseph Cheng’s research clarifies, the industrial sector is 
the key component in the area’s economic achievement and its expansion further exemplifies 
China’s predevelopment mentality.  Cheng’s findings confirm that the eastern regions have 
already achieved a higher level of economic development and the benefits of the economy to 
scale than the western and central regions.102  Although Joseph Cheng’s conclusion does not 
explicitly mention the environmental budget, it does support economic variegation of the 
provinces.  The difference between the central, western, and eastern regions industry and 
economic success will influence the decision of provincial officials on environmental protection 
and policy.  At the same time, poverty levels in Central and Western regions are high.   
                                                 
99 Joseph Cheng predicts in that the beginning of the next century, 50% of electricity in the 
Eastern region will be from the Central and Western regions, and 60% of the raw materials used 
in the Eastern regions will also be coming from the Central and Western regions. (p. 8)  
100 Joseph Cheng, 16. 
101 Joseph Cheng, 7. 
102 Joseph Cheng, 13. 
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Huang and Kuo (2003) describes geographically accessible provinces promise relatively 
higher rate of returns on investments compared to areas not easily accessible.  Therefore, the 
accessibility of coastal regions would guarantee higher investment returns, and China’s pro-
development mentality would indicate the coastal region receiving more attention from the 
national government than inland regions.  Additionally, Joseph Cheng states, “Coastal provinces 
are keen to retain their privileges, and they are often reluctant to respond to the central 
government’s appeal to help their interior counter parts.”103  This would result in maintenance of 
regional economic gap and foreign investments would follow the trend.  The accessibility of the 
coastal regions has been more exposed to foreign investments, which would further explain the 
economic strength and well-developed infrastructure.  
The regional economic gap has not always been viewed negatively; economic success of 
the coastal provinces has been utilized to further economic growth in other regions.  In the 1970s 
when China opened up trade to the outside world, the Chinese government placed an emphasis 
on the role of market mechanisms in resource allocation, which did not equally distribute the 
wealth.104  Instead, the economic reform focused on developing the coastal regions by 
establishing special economic zones, and opened up the coastal area with the objective of 
attracting foreign investments. This was the initiation the economic gap between coastal and 
inland provinces. This gap places the pressure on the coastal regions to succeed economically.  
The coastal region did as expected and succeeded economically; however, it was not until 1990 
that the economic growth widened the income gap between coastal and inland regions.105  
                                                 
103 Joseph Cheng, 6. 
104JR-Tsung Huang, "The Inequality of Regional Economic Development in China between 1991 
and 2001," (Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 1.3, 2003), 275. 
105 Huang, 276.  
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Additionally, the coastal regions also have a better response to environmental protection.  
The numbers of fines and sanctions in the coastal area is due to the combination of well 
developed infrastructure, strong economy, and government pressure.  Joseph Cheng noted in his 
paper that after 1991 GDP of provinces in the coastal areas were higher than interior areas. In 
1997, the highest GDP were all coastal provinces except for Anhui. The five provinces with the 
lowest GDP were all interior provinces except for Hainan.106 The factors of accessibility and 
structure in coastal regions are apparent in the strength of coastal regions’ economy.  The 
national government favors the coastal region due to its proof of economic success.  In 
conclusion, these factors have led to a more environmentally responsible region.   
Foreign Investment 
 
 Although, the economy and infrastructure of the coastal region enabled a relatively 
environmentally aware region, the external pressure placed on coastal provinces increases the 
probability of a strong environmental management.  The domestic pressures placed on coastal 
provinces and environmental protections previously were discussed, but international influences 
have not been accounted for.  International pressures emphasize environmental concepts; 
introduce environmental organizations, and new green standards when in China.  Coastal 
provinces received more exposure to new international environmental concepts than their inland 
counterparts did.  For example, the Olympic air quality controversy attracted global attention that 
forced the government address foreign opinion, a new step for a historically closed nation.  The 
global attention received during the 2008 Olympic Games, forced Beijing to address the air 
pollution in the city.   
                                                 
106 Cheng, 6. 
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Foreign investments in environmental protection and project are expected to increase 
based on the strong foreign influence in environmental protection and awareness.  Foreign 
investors were generally limited to coastal provinces, which have created successful economic 
hotspots at the trading ports.  Thus, coastal areas have more foreign investors and a stronger 
environmental infrastructure than inland provinces.107  Foreign investors have transported 
international environmental standards and knowledge new to the Chinese, through organizations 
such as International Organization Standardization (ISO) that increases environmental awareness 
and protection.  Elizabeth Economy also observes a continued rise in substantial international 
criticism of China and its international partners in response to large-scale, environmentally 
degrading development projects.108 Therefore as investors raise environmental expectations on 
industries, it is expected that foreign investors assist China meet regulations, particularly 
financial ones. The demand for funding of treatment of pollution is likely to increase as domestic 
pressure of an environmentally active society rises, thus it is anticipated that foreign capital 
should increase to support demands.  
In her book The River Runs Black, Elizabeth Economy states, “international trade 
regimes hold promise for reinforcing the integration of environmental objectives in China’s 
future economic development.”109  A prime example of such international influence is the 
International Organization Standardization (ISO), an environmental concept that originated from 
abroad and introduced to China by foreign investors.  ISO 14001 is an environmental concept 
recently popularly adopted by China and recognized as China’s official Environmental 
                                                 
107 Joseph Cheng, 6. 
108 Economy, 218. 
109 Economy, 218.  
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Management Systems (EMS).110  ISO 14001 is a tool that systematically identifies, monitors, and 
manages enterprise’s environmental impact that is credible in the international marketplace.  The 
annual adoption rate of ISO 14001 grew on average 170 percent between 1997 and 2000.111  
Environmental protection is more a priority for developed nation, thus the expectation of 
developed nations to continue such practices in China, to attempt to bring China to a similar 
level of environmental development.  However, Cushings redirects ISO 14001 as an instrument 
of attracting foreign investments because European nations are giving preference to companies 
that are ISO certified.  This being the case, foreign influences has not caused a higher flux in 
foreign investment, but is still influencing China to become more environmentally aware.  The 
Chinese government’s support for ISO is evident in China’s Tenth Five Year Plan “to build the 
nation’s environmental management, consulting, and certification capacity.”112  The 
environmental influence trickled down to the state level.  Local governments are adopting 
projects and programs to promote environmental improvement initiatives. 2001 data indicates 
that Guangdong, Beijing, and Jiangsu has the most ISO 14001 certification the provinces 
correspond with the concentration of industrial activity in China.113  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 Katherine Kao Cushing,  Heather McGray, and Hongyan Lu, “Understanding ISO 14001 
adoption and implementation in China,” International journal of environment and sustainable 
development 4.3 (2005), 249.  
111 Cushing, 256. 
112 Cushing, 250. 
113 Cushing, 251. 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006. National Bureau of Statistics of P.R. China Beijing: China 
Statistics Press  
 
The total investment in treatment of industrial pollution increased over time as 
hypothesized; however, the state budget and foreign investment did not increase as predicted.  
Table 4.1 lists the total investment in the treatment of industrial pollution in the first column and 
the following columns compose the source of investments for 2000 to 2005.  This data was 
collected from China’s Statistical Yearbook 2006; no data available in the book was left out and 
the five sources do not add up to the total.  The state budget decreased from 3312 million Yuan 
in 2000 to 778 million Yuan in 2005.  The state budget, however, did not start to decline until 
2003, unlike foreign investment, which decreased overall from 917 million Yuan in 2000 to 709 
million Yuan in 2005.  Despite this, the development of foreign investment remains consistent 
with the exception of the drop in 2004.  The decrease in state budget and foreign investment 
were unexpected after a clear increase in total treatment investments.  In order for this 
assessment to be accurate at least one source of funding had to rise, and three sources did 
increase investments—domestic loans, self-fundraising, and special funds for environmental 
protection.  Table 4.1 indicates the source with the largest increase capital is “self fundraising,” 
Table 4.1: Sources of Investment in the Treatment of Industrial Pollution (100 million Yuan) 
Year 
Total 
investment in 
the treatment 
of industrial 
pollution  
State 
Budget 
Special Funds 
for 
Environmental 
Protection 
Self-
fundraising  
Domestic 
Loans 
Foreign 
Investment 
2000 234.73 33.12 6.71 16.52 12.55 9.17 
2001 174.48 36.35 8.32 7.49 67.11 7.23 
2002 188.37 41.96 6.79 8 43.55 7.25 
2003 221.79 18.75 12.38 141.94 25.1 6.78 
2004 308.11 13.71 11.13 227.43 9.02 4.59 
2005 458.19 7.78 20.6 361.64 38.99 7.09 
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which is depicted in the fourth column.   For example in 2005, self-fundraising makes up 78.9 
percent of the total investments.  The fundraising fluctuations are similar to the total investment 
dropping from 2000 to 2001 and then increasing through 2005, a highly unusual trend given the 
nature of the Chinese government.  The focus away from central state support to local 
government responsibility signifies the economic shift that from Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms.  This however neither supports nor contradicts the federal government moving towards 
more proactively implementing environmental policy at state levels.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
There have been many changes in Chinese environmental enforcement since 1972 that 
led to the transition from SEPA to MEP, some of which were not possible to include in this 
paper.  Many studies focus on the changes that the Chinese environmental management system 
has made over time, while many more critique the Chinese government for not responding 
enough to environmental pollution.  However, since the transition in 2008, there have been fewer 
published critiques on China’s environmental management.  This warrants the question, is MEP 
the solution to Chinese environmental management?  In answering the question, two factors must 
be considered: 1) has adequate time passed for an assessment of the MEP and 2) what triggered 
the transition?  This paper addresses the second factor because a shared comprehension of the 
“triggers” can help promote environmental protection in other developing nations, aid in the 
prediction of China’s future actions on environmental protection, and gauge the state of the 
Chinese government.   
The paper further discusses the stimulants in three categories: social pressures, economic 
development, and financial investments (each of which was assigned a chapter for further 
development).  Social pressure used high population density as a substitute to demonstrate that 
the increase in awareness and pollution has resulted in environmental action.  Two correlations 
were assessed in Chapter 3, one between complaints and number of sanctions and the other 
between complaints and population density.  These correlations supported that in urban areas due 
to the increase in awareness and pollution there have been more complaints and sanctions (in this 
case government response).   Furthermore, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of economic 
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development impact on China.  The results indicated that economic development changed the 
economic dynamics of the nation that also changed the demands of the people.  However, 
locally, governments experienced environmental impediments such as corruption and socio-
economic ties.  Lastly, Chapter 5 focuses on financial investments that incorporate foreign 
influence in environmental management. The most enlightening finding in Chapter 5 was neither 
central-state or foreign investments were responsible for the rise in total investment in treatment 
of pollution.  Rather the increase was in response to regional environmental fundraising.  Future 
research on the source of fundraising would be valuable to further the environmental 
investments.   
Although China has room for improvement in terms of environmental management, to 
say that China has addressed and attempted to resolve environmental problems would be 
misguided.  Chapter 2 outlines Chinese environmental history, and highlights the (origins of 
environmental policy in China, the creations of the Environmental Protection Law, and the 
growth of the Five-Year Plans) key events that lead up to the establishment of the MEP.   
In conclusion, the promotion of environmental protection is necessary to the success in 
China’s environmental management system.  However, in order for future success the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection will need to address the problems at the State Environmental 
Protection Administration—the main one being the inability enforces environmental violations.  
Further adjustments that the MEP should take into consideration are placing environmental 
values at the heart of environmental policy114 and the implementation of an incentive system for 
environmental protection,115 both of which will facilitate a successful management path for the 
                                                 
114 Paul Harris, "Green or Brown? Environmental Attitudes and Governance in Greater 
China." (Nature & Culture 3.2:2008), 174.  
115 Economy, 22. 
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new ministry.  Regardless, the implications of Chinese environmental protection are not only 
going to affect the nation, but the planet.   
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